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ABSTRACT
EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT IN THE TURKISH
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY
Y·I¼G·IT, Merve
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Selin Sayek Böke
September 2010
This thesis studies the causal e¤ects of foreign ownership on plant employment
of varying degrees of FDI. I not only examine the employment e¤ects of FDI
inows by using standard denition of FDI as is standard in the literature, but
I also look into the possible di¤erentiale e¤ects of di¤erent levels of FDI and
identify these e¤ects at the 10, 25, 50, 75 and 100 percent foreign ownership in
plants, respectively. These e¤ects are tested using plant-level data from Annual
Manufacturing Industry Statistics on the Turkish Manufacturing industry. To
control for the possible selection-bias, a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach is
combined with propensity score matching. The advantage of this method is
that it allows observing the divergence in the paths of employment between
the treated plants and the matched control plants. It is shown that foreign
acquisition in Turkish manufacturing industry leads to a signicant increase
in employment in the acquired plants when the standard denition of FDI is
used. The positive and statistically signicant e¤ects become visible in the
acquisition year and continue in the subsequent periods. I nd that after three
iii
years, the acquired plants outperform the control group in terms of employment
by 21 percentage points. The signicant positive employment e¤ects are also
observed when I only focus on the private establishments, excluding public
establishments from the sample. The analysis also suggests that the positive
employment e¤ects occur together with increases in output and productivity.
However, it is observed that as the dominance of foreign partners increases in
foreign ownership percentages the employment e¤ects of FDI inows begin to
decrease.
Keywords: Turkey, Foreign Direct Investment, Employment, Manufacturing
Sector, Panel Data
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ÖZET
DO¼GRUDAN YABANCI YATIRIMLARIN TÜRK·IYE
·IMALAT SANAY·IS·INDEK·I ·IST·IHDAMA ETK·ILER·I
Y·I¼G·IT, Merve
Yüksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Selin Sayek Böke
Eylül 2010
Bu tez çal¬¸smas¬, muhtelif seviyelerdeki do¼grudan yabanc¬ yat¬r¬mlarda (DYY)
yabanc¬mülkiyetin rma istihdam¬üzerindeki nedensel etkilerini incelemektedir.
DYYlerin istihdama olan etkileri sadece literatürde standart olan standart DYY
tan¬m¬n¬kullanarak aras¸t¬r¬lm¬¸s de¼gil, ama ayn¬zamanda farkl¬düzeylerdeki DYYlerin
olas¬fark gösteren etkilerine bak¬lm¬¸s ve bu etkiler s¬ras¬yla yüzde 10, 25, 50, 75
ve 100 yabanc¬mülkiyet seviyelerinde belirlenmi¸stir. Bu etkiler Türkiye imalat
sanayisi üzerine olan rma düzeyindeki Y¬ll¬k ·Imalat Sanayi Anketi verisi kul-
lan¬larak test edilmi¸stir. Olas¬seçim yanl¬l¬¼g¬n¬kontrol etmek için farklar¬n fark¬
yöntemi e¼gilim puan¬es¸lemesi ile birles¸tirilmi¸stir. Bu yöntemin avantaj¬ tedavi
gören i¸sletme ile uyumlu kontrol i¸sletme aras¬ndaki istihdam yollar¬ndaki sapman¬n
gözlemlenmesine izin vermesidir. Standart DYY tan¬m¬kullan¬ld¬¼g¬nda, Türkiye
imalat sanayisinde yabanc¬taraf¬ndan sat¬n alma sat¬n al¬nan rmada istatiksel
olarak anlaml¬bir istihdam art¬¸s¬ile sonuçlanmaktad¬r. Pozitif ve istatiksel olarak
anlaml¬ etkiler edinme y¬l¬ görünür hale gelmekte ve daha sonraki dönemlerde
devam etmektedir. Üç sene sonra, edinilen rmalar kontrol rmalar¬na 21 puan-
l¬k istihdam aç¬s¬ndan üstün gelmektedir. Kamu kurulus¸lar¬hariç olmak üzere,
v
istatiksel olarak anlaml¬ve pozitif etkiler ayn¬zamanda sadece özel kurulus¸lar üz-
erine odaklan¬ld¬¼g¬nda da gözlemlenmi¸stir. Analiz ayn¬zamanda göstermektedir ki
pozitif istihdam etkileri ç¬kt¬ve verimlilik art¬¸slar¬ile birlikte gerçekles¸mi¸stir. An-
cak, yabanc¬ortaklar¬n yabanc¬mülkiyet yüzdelerindeki hakimiyeti artt¬kça DYY
ak¬¸slar¬n¬n istihdama olan etkilerinin azalmaya bas¸lad¬¼g¬gözlemlenmi¸stir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Do¼grudan Yabanc¬Yat¬r¬mlar, ·Istihdam, ·Imalat Sek-
törü, Panel Veri
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Since the mid-1980s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) started to play a signi-
cant role where both developed and developing countries have started to attracted
signicant amount of FDIs. Since it is believed that FDI can be the channel to
increase productivity and economic growth in the host economy, in many countries
policies have been adopted to attract more FDI inows. Meanwhile FDI is also seen
as an important channel to create jobs in host economies.
There exists a vast empirical literature on the e¤ects of FDI. While the majority
of these previous studies focus on economic growth, wage di¤erentials, technology
spillover and foreign trade e¤ects; relatively few studies look into the relationship
between employment and FDI inows.
Both academics and policy-makers suggest that increasing globalization, both in
the from of FDI and international trade, has a dramatic e¤ect on labor demand in
the world. In the literature studies commonly focus on the knowledge spillovers from
FDI and point out that the host country will benet from additional employment
only if the advanced technology of MNCs is transferred e¤ectively to domestically
owned companies. If this is not the case, and if foreign rms are likely to employ
labour from existing domestic rms and expatriates then FDI will have a marginal
e¤ect on employment in host economies (Dri¢ eld and Taylor, 2000). Even without
looking the knowledge spillovers e¤ects, the direct positive employment e¤ects of
FDI inows are observed in this thesis.
This thesis investigates the causal link between foreign ownership and plant em-
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ployment. While there are few studies that have examined the causal relationship
between FDI inows and employment, the question has not been explored by using
the methodology of di¤erence-in-di¤erences combined with propensity score match-
ing except in Arnold and Javorcik (2005). Furthermore, not only do I examine the
employment e¤ects of FDI inows by using the standard denition of FDI1 as is
standard in the literature, but also I look into the possible di¤erentiale e¤ects of
di¤erent levels of FDI and identify these e¤ects at the 10, 25, 50, 75 and 100 percent
levels, of foreign ownership respectively.
Identifying the causal relation between FDI and employment is not straight-
forward. If already existing rms that have higher employment are a¢ liated by
foreign investors, then the ownership status becomes endogenous and ordinary least
squares estimations produce invalid results. To control for the endogeneity of the
FDI decision di¤erence-in-di¤erences is combined with propensity score matching.
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach allows us to compare the performance of foreign
ownership with the performance of otherwise identical "statistical twins"; however,
this methodology still su¤ers from a "selection bias" problem. In order to con-
trol for the selection bias di¤erence-in-di¤erences is combined with propensity score
matching.
The propensity score matching technique addresses the counterfactual question
of what would have happened to those who, in fact, did receive treatment, if they
had not received treatment or vice versa.2 For the counterfactuals we can only cre-
ate an estimate since they are unobservable and, this technique creates the missing
counterfactual of an acquired plant had it remained in domestic hands by pairing
up each plant that will receive FDI in the future with a domestic plant that has very
similar plant characteristics operating in the same sector and year. The propensity
score matching is then combined with di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach. The advan-
1In the literature, plants with 10 percent or more foreign ownership are considered as foreign
a¢ liated.
2In order to employ the matching procedure, rst the probability of receiving FDI is calculated
for each rm for each year and sector. Moreover, for the purpose of the study total factor produc-
tivity is estimated at the level of 3-digit sectors by using the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) procedure.
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tage of combining propensity score matching approach with di¤erence-in-di¤erences
is to observe the divergence in the paths of performance between the treated plants
and the matched control plants that had similar characteristics in the pre-acquisition
year (Arnold and Javorcik, 2005). The benets of combining these two approaches is
also well accepted by recent studies which argue that the standard matching estima-
tors are unsatisfactory, but in combination with di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach
the matching analysis improves "...the quality of non-experimental evaluation re-
sults signicantly" (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000, p. 438). Furthermore with
the di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach we are also able to eliminate unobserved xed
e¤ect di¤erences in employment between acquired plants and non acquired plants
whereas the standard matching estimators fail such an elimination (Smith and Todd,
2005).
The methodology used in this thesis has further advantages. Unlike other ap-
proaches such as the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure or GMM, di¤erence-in-
di¤erences propensity score matching estimation does not require any restrictions,
namely the restrictions are of using a proxy measure or an instrumental variable
(Arnold and Javorcik, 2005). The Heckman (1979) two-step procedure requires a
proxy measure that a¤ects the probability of receiving FDI but not the subsequent
plant performance. Arnold and Javorcik (2005) suggest that nding such variables
is almost impossible. Also, unlike the GMM approach we do not have to use lagged
values as instruments for the level of the lagged dependent variable and other de-
pendent variable and thereby we do not have to question the appropriateness of lags
as instruments. Besides, unlike GMM, this approach is not dependent on the second
order correlation in the data. Furthermore, rather than just estimating the average
e¤ect of receiving FDI, this methodology allows us to follow the trajectory of FDI
recipients (Arnold and Javorcik, 2005).
Despite the relevance of the issue for Turkey, there are relatively very few studies
that examine the e¤ects of foreign acquisitions on employment and moreover, these
few studies often disagree on the employment e¤ects of FDI inows.
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The plant-level data employed in this paper is from the Annual Manufacturing
Industry Statistics on the Turkish Manufacturing industry which has been collected
from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT). Although Turkey has experi-
enced low levels of FDI inows until 2005 compared to world FDI inows, due to the
availability of the data, this study covers the period of 1990-2001.3 The average FDI
inows to Turkey throughout the period of 1990-1996 was $834 million on average
where this number has slightly increased to $900 million in the period 1997-2000
with the introduction of the customs union between EU and Turkey. The average
FDI inows to Turkey has increased sharply after 2001. For the years between 2002-
2004 the average FDI inows was $1.925 billion while it increased to $17.420 billion
in the period 2005-2007. However, the low levels of FDI compared to other years do
not create any problems for the purpose of our study. First of all, note that, when
the sectoral composition of FDI inows in Turkey are examined, manufacturing is
seen to be the top FDI receiving sector with the share of 53% of total FDI inows
during the late 1990s and early 2000s.4 Second, the extent of the data and the
number of plants considered is quite long and large enough to generalize our results
with condence.
The results show that, by using the standard denition of FDI, foreign ownership
has a signicant positive e¤ect on plant employment and suggest that the acquired
rms enjoy an employment advantage over the rms that remained in domestic
hands by about 21 percentage in the third year of the ownership. About half of the
positive e¤ect is observed during the year foreign acquisition takes place with the rest
occurring during the following two years. However, as the dominance of the foreign
ownership increases the employment e¤ects of FDI inows begin to decrease. This
situation can be explained by the fact that the increase in foreign managerial control
makes the restructuring process more active and there is much awaited employment
improvement in the domestic rms, does not take place.
3Due to the change in the structure of the database, this study does not cover the period after
2001.
4See Figure-5.
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To assess the validity of the results, some robustness checks are conducted. First,
I show that the positive employment e¤ects persist when I extend the time horizon
under consideration to ve years of foreign ownership. This robustness check shows
that receiving FDI inows does not only lead to an employment increase in the
acquisition year but also in the subsequent periods. Second, to ensure that our
results are not driven by the restriction of matching within the same sector and
year, I relax the restriction and still observe positive signicant employment e¤ects.
Finally, I provide evidence indicating that employment improvements take place
simultaneously with increases in productivity and output.
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the literature, chapter 3
gives details of data and methodology, chapter 4 presents the results and chapter 5
concludes.
5
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Understanding the nature of the relationship between FDI inows and economic
activities has been an issue of concern to both policy-makers and researchers in
the recent decades. In the literature macroeconomic e¤ects of FDI inows on the
host and home economies have been widely analyzed. While numerous studies
have achieved remarkable progress in explaining the e¤ects on economic growth,
wage di¤erentials, technology spillover and foreign trade, there are relatively less
studies devoted to the e¤ects on employment.
On top of it, the studies on the employment e¤ects of FDI are unable to form a
consensus among themselves. The debates point that those e¤ects can change from
one country to another or even can di¤er from one sector to another. The studies
mostly explain this heterogeneity of the response to FDI presence as country-
specic features, the form of FDI and sector di¤erences.
The form of FDI inows in the host country can a¤ect direct employment
when FDI inows are in the mergers and acquisitions.1 Because mergers and
acquisitions can lead job losses in the existing domestic rms, at least initially,
because of rationalization of the operations of the enlarged rm. Therefore, in the
literature it has been commonly accepted that Greeneld FDI2 is more likely to
create jobs than mergers and acquisitions (McDonald et al., 2003). However it
1Mergers and acquisitions are the investment which aims to get the already existing havings
of a local company by foreign investors.
2Greeneld investment is a form of foreign direct investment, when investorscompany builds
a new asset in host economy. As well as the buildings, new jobs are also o¤ered in the host country.
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should be also noted that the initial e¤ect of mergers and acquisitions can change
in the following years due to the realization of browneld investments.3 In the
long run backward and forward linkages within the domestic economy can provide
employment to increase as a result of increase in production capacity of the rms
(As¸¬c¬et al., 2009).
A number of macroeconomic empirical studies on the impact of FDI inows on
employment indicate that FDI plays a signicant and positive role on employment.
In a recent study by Karlsson et al. (2009), the employment e¤ects of FDI is ana-
lyzed by using the Heckman (1979) two step procedure on Chinese manufacturing
industry for the periods of 1998-2004. They establish that positive employment
e¤ects from FDI inows are due to high survival rates of foreign-owned rms and
rm characteristics, and these positive e¤ects on private-domestic rms are due to
spillovers.
Other economies have also been empirically investigated and the positive e¤ects
on employment are also found to be evident in the UK and Irish economies. An
econometric study conducted by Dri¢ led (1999) on the UKmanufacturing industry
for two separate time periods, from 1986 to 1989 and from 1989 to 1992 also
provides evidence for positive e¤ects of FDI inows. Moreover, the studies on the
Irish manufacturing industry (Barry and Bradley, 1997; Figini and Görg, 1999)
provide evidence indicating that multinational companies have provided about
45% of employment in manufacturing industry over the last two decades. These
studies commonly argue that FDI encourages demand for labor but host country
will benet from additional employment only if the advanced technology of MNCs
is transferred e¤ectively to domestically owned companies. If this is not the case,
and if foreign rms are likely to employ labor from existing domestic rms and
expatriates then FDI will have a marginal e¤ect on employment in host economies
(Dri¢ eld and Taylor, 2000).
3Meyer and Estrin (2001) dened browneld investment as "Browneld investment is a foreign
acquisition undertaken as part of the establishment of a local operation. From the outset, its
resources and capabilities are primarily provided by the investor, replacing most resources and
capabilities of the acquired rm."
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Axarloglou and Pournarakis (2007) examine the e¤ects of FDI inows on local
economies of the US states in manufacturing for the period of 1974-1994 and nd
that the e¤ects di¤er among industries. They observe that FDI in industries such
as printing&publishing and transport equipment and instruments have positive
e¤ects on local employment and wages across several US states whereas FDI in
industries such as leather&stone, clay and glass have detrimental e¤ects on local
employment and wages.
Aitken and Harrison (1999) and DeMello (1999) nd that FDI spillovers are
small and the competition e¤ect combined with labor switching from domestic
rms to foreign owned rms cause productivity to decrease in the domestic rms
thereby in the long run, hamstring the positive employment e¤ects of FDI inows.
Not only are there relatively few studies that examine the causal e¤ects of
foreign ownership on employment, these studies only look at the employment e¤ects
of FDI inows by using the standard denition of FDI. However, I nd it important
to look at the possible di¤erentiale e¤ects of di¤erent levels of foreign control and
examine these e¤ects at di¤erent extents of foreign ownership.
Despite the possible contribution of FDI to employment in Turkey their re-
lationship has been little explored so far. Furthermore, these few studies often
disagree on the employment e¤ects of FDI inows.
Karagöz (2007) for the period of 1970-2005 and Aktar and Ozturk (2009) for
the period of 2001-20074 analyze the e¤ects of FDI inows on employment by
using time series analysis and nd that the results suggest no causal relationship
between Turkeys FDI inows and employment. Another study by As¸¬c¬ et al.
(2009), on the other hand, examines the relationship between employment and
FDI at a sectoral level by analyzing 10 sectors and 9 manufacturing sub-sectors
for the period of 2000-2007. A negative relation between employment and FDI
inows is observed by using dynamic panel data analysis and applying the GMM
approach.
4Quarterly data is used (2001:1-2007:4).
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There are some shortcomings in these studies, however. For instance, Karagöz
(2007) and Aktar and Ozturk (2009) employ aggregated data. As noted before
in the literature it is suggested that the e¤ects of FDI can di¤er among sectors,
therefore using aggregated data without considering industries or sectors may lead
to di¤erent. Secondly, the data used in the analysis of Karagöz (2007) covers a
time period hidden by major structural breaks in terms of FDI inows. As noted
before, Turkey has attracted a very low level of FDI until the early 2000s but then
inows have increased enormously after 2001 and reached record levels between
2005 and 2007.
Nevertheless, all these papers on Turkey argue that mergers and acquisitions
is the main reason for not observing the positive e¤ects of FDI. Their arguments
are based on the ndings in the literature that suggests greeneld investments are
more likely to create more jobs than mergers and acquisitions.5 However, As¸¬c¬
et al. (2009) point out that their study has limitations in itself because of their
data. Rather than observing the long-term impact they are only able to observe
the e¤ects of foreign acquisitions for the acquisition year and the following year,
therefore they are not able to examine browneld investment e¤ects, if any.
As can be seen, one can not reach any unique conclusion on the employment
e¤ects of FDI for Turkey. Discrepancies between the results can be attributed to
the di¤erent time periods and the sectors that are covered by these studies.
Identifying the causality between employment and FDI inows is not straight-
forward and the selection bias problem is the leading factor to observe invalid
ordinary least squares estimations since plants acquired by foreign investors are
unlikely to be a random sample from the population. Karlsson et al. (2009) take
into account this problem and correct for the selection bias by using Heckmans two
step procedure. Within the studies on Turkey, only As¸¬c¬et al. (2009) control for
the endogeneity of the ownership by using the lagged values of the rst di¤erences
5Although in Turkey it seems that mergers and acquisitions (M&As) follow greeneld invest-
ments as the secondary in the existing rms for the period of 2000 and 2008 (Turkish Treasury,
2008), Y¬lmaz (2007, 10-12) points out the dominance of M&As and privatization rather than
greeneld investments when the average sizes of capital invested are considered.
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as instruments, using a system GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond
(1991). The di¤erence in methodologies and results indicate that the empirical
methodology may strongly a¤ect the conclusions on whether employment e¤ects
of FDI are positive, negative or insignicant. The methodology employed in this
paper controls for the selection bias problem and does not require any restrictions.
Moreover, rather than only observe the average e¤ects of foreign ownership e¤ects
we are able to follow the trajectory of FDI recipients. Hence, the methodology
of di¤erence-in-di¤erences combined with propensity score matching has several
advantages over the other empirical methodologies.
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CHAPTER 3
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 FDI Inows in Turkey
This section will present worldwide FDI inow trends and will discuss those inows
in detail for Turkey. With increased globalization, both developed and developing
countries have started to attract FDIs into their economies. Since it is believed
that FDI can be the channel to increase productivity, economic growth and reduce
unemployment in the host economy, several policies have been adopted to attract
more FDI inows. As can be seen in Figure-1, the upward trend of FDI inows is
observed for both developed and developing countries.
The world FDI inows grew by 23% in 2006 and reached a new record level of
$1,833 billion in 2007. With inows of $1,833 billion, the previous record observed
in 2000 was passed by $400 billion. The upward trend in FDI inows are observed
in both developed and developing countries. In developed countries, FDI inows
increased in 2007 by 33% more than in 2006 and reached $1,248 billion. In de-
veloping countries FDI inows reached a new record level of $ 500 billion by 21%
increase from 2006 to 2007 (UNCTAD, 2008).
However, as Figure-2 presents, Turkey has attracted only a very low level of
FDI compared to many other developing countries until the early 2000s. Turkey
had a closed economy based on import substituting industrialization before 1980s
with insignicant FDI share, and after 1980 due to an export led growth model, has
began to receive FDI inows. However, compared with world FDI inows, these
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inows continued to be low until 2005. When one compares the performance of
Turkey in attracting FDI with the three most important host countries among the
transition economies, namely Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, it is still not
as successful as these three countries. As can be seen in Figure-4, the gap between
FDI inows have persisted throughout the period. Although this gap decreased in
2001 compared to previous years, this can be attributed to the fact that in 2001
the GSM tender led to a sharp increase in the FDI inows in Turkey.1
The numerical values will present a clearer picture for FDI inows in Turkey.
The average annual FDI inows to Turkey throughout the period of 1990-1996
was $834 million where this number has slightly increased to $900 million in the
period 1997-2000 with the customs union between Turkey and the European Union
coming into e¤ect. The average FDI inows to Turkey has increased sharply after
2001. For the years between 2002-2004 the average annual FDI inows was $1.925
billion while it increased to $17.4 billion in the period 2005-2007.2 As can be
seen in Figure-5, when the sectoral composition of FDI inows in Turkey are
examined, manufacturing is seen to be the top FDI receiving sector with a share
of 53% of total FDI inows during the late 1990s and early 2000s. However this
picture has changed after the early 2000s and service related sectors became the
top FDI receiving sectors (see Figure-6). Financial services attracted the most
service-related FDI in 2007 with $11.4 billion FDI inows3, followed by real estate
receiving nearly $3 billion ad transport and telecommunications with $1.1 billion
(UNCTAD, 2008). By the recent acquisition of Migros by BC Partners (United
Kingdom) retailing sector also attracted foreign investors in Turkey. In the primary
sector, FDI inows of $341 million took place in the mining industry in 2007,
following the Mining Law of 2004 that eased privatization and foreign ownership
(UNCTAD, 2008).
1The Telecom Italia which is the foreign partner of the GSM Is-TIM Telekominikasyon
Hizmetleti A.S. company, gave credit and counted as inows to Turkey.
2However, due to the availability of the data, this study covers the period until 2001.
3Such as the acquisitions of Finansbank, Akbank, Oyakbank, Denizbank FS by National
Bank of Greece, Citibank, ING Group, Dexia; respectively.
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This study focuses on the plants that are operating in the manufacturing sector.
The details about the data-set used in this analysis are given in the next section.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Data Set Description
The survey data employed in this paper is Annual Manufacturing Industry Statis-
tics on the Turkish Manufacturing industry which has been conducted by Turkish
Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT) on annual basis.
Since 1980, Census of Industry and Business Establishments (CIBE) is period-
ically conducted by TURKSTAT. TURKSTAT conducts CIBE every 10 years for
every industry.4 TURKSTAT collects CIBE form establishments with 1 or more
employees and gathers information on addresses and employment of rms. For
establishments that have 10 or more employees, information is collected from the
chamber of industry annually. In addition, after collecting addresses TURKSTAT
conducts Annual Survey of Manufacturing Industries (ASMI) for establishments
that have 10 or more employees.
Up to 1983, the data set only covers the establishments with 10 or more em-
ployees engaged in the private sector. After then, Manufacturing Industry Surveys
began to cover the establishments in the public sector and the establishments with
25 or more employees engaged in the private sector. In this study, only data on
establishments with 25 or more employees is used because the necessary variables
are not available for the establishments with employees less than 25.5 Since the
information we are interested in is available from 1989 our sample cover the period
between 1990 and 2001.
The survey data employed in this analysis allows us to determine the form of
4CIBE is conducted only in 1992 throughout the period of this analysis.
5The capital stock series is constructed from 1983 in order to avoid the problems that may
arise from the initial capital stock calculation. However, for the rms that have 10-24 employees,
detailed investment series that are needed to construct capital stock series is only available after
1991. Moreover, for these rms, the fuel consumption is included in material inputs and cannot
be extracted. Therefore, these rms are excluded in this analysis.
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ownership of the establishments. In particular, we are able to determine whether
a rm is state-owned, private and foreign a¢ liated. Furthermore, along enough
time series enables us to observe the changes in the ownership form.
Total number of rms and foreign a¢ liated rms increased throughout the
period. Table-1 presents the total number of rms and foreign rms for each year
in the analysis. Although the number of foreign a¢ liated rms increased by %78
percent from 1992 to 2001, the percentage share of the foreign a¢ liated rms have
only increased from 3.9 percent to 4.9 percent in 2001 (see Table-1).
In our data set, as illustrated in Table-2, foreign a¢ liated rms have the highest
share in the sectors of industrial chemicals (351), other chemicals (352), electrical
machinery (383) and transport equipment (384). The sectors with the lowest share
of foreign rms are leather products (323) and footwear (324).
In the analysis, in order to increase the reliability of the model, all combi-
nations of sectors, years where no foreign acquisitions or one foreign acquisition
occurred are dropped. Hence the sectors beverages (313), leather products (323),
footwear (324), wood products (331), furniture (332), ceramics (361), glass (362),
nonferrous metal (372) and other manufacturing products (390) are dropped from
the analysis.6 ;7 ;8 ;9
In the next sections the detailed descriptions of the capital stock and total
factor productivity calculations are given in detail. Although we will not be using
capital stock and total factor productivity in our primary analysis, in order to
calculate the propensity scores we need the information on capital stock and total
factor productivity.
6For the analysis of 75 percent foreign acquisitions, in addition to the above sectors, the
sectors food miscellaneous (312), paper (341), rubber products (355) and fabricated metals (381)
are also dropped.
7For the analysis of 100 percent foreign acquisitions, in addition to the above sectors, the
sectors food miscellaneous (312), textiles (321), paper (341), rubber products (355), plastics
(356), non-metal minerals (369), fabricated metals (381), non-electrical machinery (382) and
transport equipment (384) are also dropped.
8Also, the data have been cleaned for obvious keypunch errors. The outlier values are replaced
by adjacent values whenever there is a drop to zero followed by a return to previous year value
(e.g. 100,100,0,100), or a mistake in decimal value (4950,5050,49.5,50.5).
9The descriptive statistics on number of foreign a¢ liated rms according to FDI inow levels
are given in Table-3.
14
3.2.2 Production Function Estimates and Measures of the
Capital Stock
The data contains information on variables that are commonly used in estimation
of rm level production functions. Specically, data set contains on information on
value of output, number of employees, values of material inputs, electricity, fuels
and investment. The capital stock variable has been newly constructed using the
perpetual inventory method and the detailed description of capital series construc-
tion is provided below. Note that output, material inputs, energy and capital each
have their own price deator and all are measured in 1990 Turkish Liras.
The value of output is calculated by subtracting the value of the beginning
of the year stock from the sum of revenues from sales and services, the value of
stock nal products at the end of the year and the revenues from the contract
manufacturing. The output variable is deated by the relevant three-digit output
price deator.
In the data measures of the labor force are readily available, where total labor
is the sum of the number of employees of the rms in a given year. The data allows
us to observe the distribution of the labors groups among their skills. Labor force
is classied into two groups; production and non-production workers. Production
workers are classied as technical personnel, foremen and workers. Moreover, tech-
nical personnel is divided into high-level and middle-level technical personnel. The
employees that work in non-production are classied as management employees,
o¢ ce employees and other type of employees. Furthermore, information on wages
paid to production and non-production workers is available in the data set.
The value of material inputs is calculated by summing up the value of purchases
of intermediate inputs (excluding the fuel) and the value of the beginning of the
year stock of material inputs and subtracting the value of stock of material inputs
at the end of the year from the above summation. The material inputs variable is
deated by the relevant three-digit price deator.
Energy variable is the sum of the value of electricity used in production and
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fuel purchases. Electricity used in production is calculated by summing up the
value of electricity produced and the value of electricity purchased and subtracting
the value of electricity sold. Both electricity and fuel are deated by their own
relevant price deator.
Though measures of the total labor force are readily available, measures of
capital must be constructed. The data contains information on investment in ma-
chinery and equipment, transportation equipment, building and structure, o¢ ce
equipment and nally in computer and programming. From 1983 we have infor-
mation on all the series except computer and programing where investment series
are on computer and programming are available since 1995. The di¤erent invest-
ment series are deated by aggregate investment deator because the disaggregated
investment deator is not available.10
In the data we are not able to observe capital stock series explicitly for ma-
chinery and equipment, transportation equipment, building and structure, o¢ ce
equipment and computer programming. In order to calculate the capital stock on
these series, information on investment is used and capital stock series are found
by applying the perpetual inventory method.
Since the data set does not contain information on capital stock in any year
initial capital stock series is constructed for each establishment. Initial capital
stock series is computed by assuming that the establishments are on their balanced
growth path. By doing so, denoting the initial year by "0", a capital growth rate
_Ki;t can be constructed for each rm i:
_Ki;t =
Ki;t+1  Ki;t
Ki;t
(3.1)
and the initial capital stock is calculated as:
K1 = (1  )K0 + I0 (3.2)
10The aggregate investment deator is obtained from Sayg¬l¬et al. (2005).
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K1
K0
= (1  ) + I0
K0
(3.3)
If the balanced growth path is satised:
K1
K0
=
Y1
Y0
= 1 + _K0 (3.4)
Substituting (3:4) into (3:3) gives
1 + _K0 = (1  ) + I0
K0
(3.5)
_K0 +  =
I0
K0
(3.6)
The initial capital stock can therefore be obtained by solving the following
equation since we already have measures of gross investment in each period given
by I0:
K0 =
I0
_K0 + 
; 8 I0 6= 0 (3.7)
Having calculated the initial values, any remaining values are calculated by
using the standard equation:
Kt = (1  )Kt 1 + It (3.8)
Applying 5%, 10%, 20% and 30% as the depreciation rates for building and
structure, machinery and equipment, transportation equipment, computer and
programming, respectively, initial capital stock is calculated.11
By structure, the data contains zero investment observations. For the establish-
ments that are reported zero investment for the entry year, it is assumed that they
can not be producing without capital. Hence initial capital stock for these rms is
calculated where positive investment is reported and this amount is iterated back
to the entry year by dividing capital stock (1  ) each year.
11The depreciation rates are gathered from Y¬lmaz and Özler (2005).
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Total capital stock series of a rm is calculated by summing up the capital
stock series on building and structure machinery and equipment, and computer
and programming.
Table-4 summarizes the statistics on the Turkish manufacturing industry. For-
eign rms are much larger in terms of number of employees when one compares
their average employment with domestic rms. In addition, foreign rms have
higher production and are more capital intensive when the average output and
capital/labor are compared with domestic rms. Finally, the average total factor
productivity of foreign rms are higher than the domestic rms. Note that, all of
these di¤erences are statistically signicant.
Table-5 presents the summary statistics by sector. The sectors with the highest
employment and production are industrial chemicals (351), ceramics (361), glass
(362), electrical machinery (383) and transport equipment (384). The most capital
intensive sectors are beverages (313), textiles (321), industrial chemicals (351),
other chemicals (352), ceramics (361), glass (362) and fabricated metals (381).
Finally, the sectors with the highest productivity are wearing appeal (322), leather
products (323), industrial chemicals (351), fabricated metals (381), and electrical
machinery (383).
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3.3 Methodology
3.3.1 Methodology for TFP Calculation
In recent years there have been a surge in both theoretical and empirical studies
of the total factor productivity (TFP). Typically, it is assumed that output is a
function of the inputs the rm employs and its productivity. The measure of TFP
is obtained as the residual in this establishment-level productivity studies.
The earlier studies estimated TFP using traditional methods i.e.; by applying
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to Cobb-Douglas production function. However,
using OLS estimation may create some methodological problems. Specically the
production function takes the following Cobb-Douglas form:
Yit = Ait(Kit)
K (Lit)
L(Mit)
M (Eit)
e (3.9)
Where Yit represents physical output of rm i in period t ; Kit; Lit, Mit and
Eit are inputs of capital, labor, materials and energy respectively and Ait is the
Hicksian neutral e¢ ciency level of a rm i in period t.
Yit; Kit; Lit;Mit and Eit are all observable to the researcher. Taking natural
logs of equation (3:9) results in a linear production function,
yit = 0 + kkit + llit + mmi + eei + "it (3.10)
Where small-case letters demote natural logarithms of the variables and Ait
takes the following form,
ln(Ait) = 0 + "it (3.11)
0 denotes the measurement of the mean e¢ ciency level across rms and over-
time; and "it is the time specic and producer specic deviation from that mean.
"it can be decomposed into an observable (observable to the rm but not to the
econometrician) and unobservable component (measurement error). Observable
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component of "it can also be named as rm-level productivity.
One of the problems that OLS produces in estimation of the production function
is the endogeneity problem. OLS requires that the inputs in the production
function are exogenous or, in other words, determined independently from the
rms e¢ ciency level. However, as Marschak and Andrews (1944) already noted,
a rms input decision in the production function are not independently chosen,
but rather determined by the characteristics of the rm, including its e¢ ciency .
If a rm has prior knowledge of its level productivity (observed component of "it)
at the time input decisions are made, endogeneity arises since prior beliefs about
productivity will a¤ect input decisions (Olley and Pakes, 1996). If there is a serial
correlation in productivity which is embodied in "it as an observable component, a
positive productivity shock will lead to an increase in input variable usage; causing
an upward bias in the estimation of input coe¢ cients for labor and materials.
In addition to endogeneity problem, selection bias problem also arises in the
estimation of OLS. Traditional method for TFP estimation omit all rm that enter
or exit over the sample period by constructing a balanced panel (Olley and Pakes,
1996). However, several theoretical models predict that the growth and exit of
rms is motivated to a large extent by productivity di¤erences at the rm level.
Conditional on being in the data set, if productivity level is known by rms
prior to their exit, a correlation between "it and the xed input capital will exist.
This correlation causes that rms with a higher capital supply in this period will be
able to withstand lower productivity level without exiting in the next period. The
selection bias problem causes a negative correlation between "it and Kit, causing
the researcher to underestimate the capital coe¢ cient in a balanced sample.
In response to these methodological problems, several methodologies like xed
e¤ects, instrumental variables and Generalized Method Moments (GMM) have
not been successful in reducing these problems for production functions. The un-
derlying reason behind the poorness of these methodologies is their assumption.
Hence, a number of semiparametric estimators have been proposed in the litera-
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ture. Both Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) addresses the
simultaneity bias problem and developed a semiparametric estimator.
Olley and Pakes (1996) have introduced a consistent semiparametric estimator
and were the rst to take selection bias explicitly into account. They overcome
this problem by using the rms investment decision to proxy for unobserved pro-
ductivity shocks. By doing so, eliminate the correlation between variable inputs
and productivity shocks. Furthermore, they address the selection bias problem by
integrating an exit-entry rule into their model.
While Olley and Pakes (1996) use the investment decision to proxy for un-
observed productivity shocks; Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) propose to use inter-
mediate inputs as a proxy. Levinsohn and Petrin suggest that the monotonicity
condition of Olley-Pakes that requires investment to strictly increase in produc-
tivity can not be satised with the data that includes signicant number of zero-
investment. While the monotonicity condition can not be satised with the data
including zero-investment reporting, deleting these observations will cause loss in
e¢ ciency. Therefore, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) propose to use intermediate
inputs to proxy for unobserved productivity shocks. Since usually positive use of
materials and energy are reported in each year, it is possible to keep more ob-
servations; which also implies that the monotonicity condition is more likely to
hold.
The estimation procedure of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) is explained in detail
below. By disaggregating the error term it into its observed component, wit, pro-
ductivity shocks known to the rm and unobservable component, it, measurement
error, it is possible to rewrite (3:10) as follows:
yit = 0 + kkit + llit + mmi + eei + wit + it (3.12)
Using intermediate inputs as a proxy for unobserved productivity implies that
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material inputs are expressed as a function of capital and productivity, i.e.:
mit = mt(kit; wit) (3.13)
Levinsohn and Petrin assume that the monotonicity condition is satised and
material inputs are strictly increasing in productivity which allows for the inversion
of the above function:
wit = wt(kit;mit) (3.14)
The unobservable productivity term is now a function of two known.
In addition to above assumption, Levinsohn and Petrin further assume that
productivity shocks follow a rst-order Markov process:
wit+1 = E[wit+1 j wit] + it+1 (3.15)
Value added is considered as the dependent variable rather than output. Be-
cause when output is used as the dependent variable the LP procedure is not able
to identify the coe¢ cients for material inputs, energy, labor and capital because of
the lack of variation in data (Arnold, 2005). I face with the same problem for the
Turkish manufacturing industry, therefore, value added is used as the dependent
variable.
Value added is dened as gross output net of intermediate inputs and computed
as the following:
vit = yit   mmit   eeit (3.16)
Substituting (3:16) into the production function (3:12), (3:12) can be written
as follows:
vit = 0 + 1lit + kkit + wit + it (3.17)
By substituting (3:14) into (3:17) the following equation is obtained:
vit = llit + t(kit;mit) + it (3.18)
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where
it(kit;mit) = 0 + kkit + wt (kit;mit) (3.19)
From estimation of equation (3:18) at the rst stage of Levinsohn-Petrin, a
consistent estimate of l is obtained where (3:18) is estimated by substituting a
higher order polynomial in kit and mit for wt(kit;mit). The second stage of LP
helps to identify the coe¢ cient k.
The coe¢ cient of labor and predicted values of value added are the known
variables at this stage. Hence one can write the estimated it(kit;mit) as the
following:
it = v^it   ^llit (3.20)
From (3:19) it is known that
wit = ^it   kkit (3.21)
In addition to these, the assumption that is made on the productivity shocks
enables to predict wit:
w^it = E[w^it j wit 1] = 0 + 1wit 1 + 2w2it 1 + 3w3it 1 + "t (3.22)
Hence, LP write the sample residual of the production function as:
wit + it = vit   ^llit   kkit   E[w^it j wit 1] (3.23)
Then, the coe¢ cient of capital that gives a solution to the minimization of
(3:22) gives the consistent estimate of capital, k:
Due to the data in hand, Levinsohn and Petrin estimation methodology is
used in this analysis.12 As mentioned before, Turkish manufacturing industry data
contains a large number of zero observations in investment. I could have used Olley
12Carried out using the Stata 10 levpet command.
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and Pakes, however, this would lead to delete zero investment observations for to
satisfy monotonicity assumption. Although the monotonicity condition would be
met by doing so, it would cause loss in e¢ ciency of the estimators. Levinsohn-
Petrin is also applied to sectors individually rather than applying it on the whole
manufacturing industry.
Table-6 and Table-7 presents the estimation results of the TFP and the produc-
tion function by using OLS and Levinsohn and Petrin, respectively. As expected,
the coe¢ cient on capital is moved in the upward direction by Levinsohn and Petrin
procedure when compared to OLS estimation of the production function. This
gives a signal that the correction is working properly.
3.3.2 Methodology for Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences combined
with Propensity Score Matching
Following Arnold and Javorcik (2005), the rst step of our empirical strategy,
namely di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach allows us to compare the performance of
foreign acquisition with the performance of otherwise identical "statistical twins".
Due to its nature, the disadvantage of this approach is that it reduces the number
of plants considered. The quality of the estimations therefore depends much on
the data availability. Since we have a data set with a large enough sample size,
our results do not su¤er from this problem.
Employing di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach allows us to observe the (cumu-
lative) changes in performance of ownerships; however, this methodology still suf-
fers from non-random sample selection that leads to a problem of selection bias.
To address this problem propensity score matching technique is combined with
di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach. "The matching procedure controls for the se-
lection bias by restricting the comparison to di¤erences within carefully selected
pair of plants." (Arnold and Javorcik, 2005). By this method, an acquired plant
and domestic plant is matched where these 2 rms have similar plant characteristics
in the pre-acquisition year.
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If foreign investors are more willing to invest in high productive plants and
more technology incentive industries then an endogeneity problem arises in the
regressions and the employment di¤erence between foreign and domestic rms
would be di¢ cult to interpret since the usual least squares estimations produce
invalid results. This is why propensity score matching is used to identify the causal
e¤ects of foreign ownership. The causal e¤ect of foreign acquisition on employment
dened as13:
E(Emp1   Emp0 jFDI=1) = E(Emp1 jFDI=1)  E(Emp0 jFDI=1) (3.24)
where FDI 2 (0; 1) is an indicator of whether plant is acquired by a foreign
ownership, Emp1 is the employment level of the plant following acquisition and
Emp0 denotes the employment level of the plant it had not been treated.
This equation gives the di¤erence between the employment paths of plants that
changed ownership (rst term) and the analagous outcome of the same plants had
they not been acquired by foreign investors (second outcome). However, in the
data we are not able to observe the second term, namely the unobserved counter-
factual. The matching procedure addresses the counterfactual question of what
would have happened to those who did receive treatment if they had not received
treatment. This technique creates the missing counterfactual of an acquired plant
had it remained in domestic hands by pairing up each plant that will receive FDI
in the future with a domestic plant that has very similar plant characteristics op-
erating in the same sector and year. The underlying assumption for the validity
of the matching procedure is that conditional on observable plant characteristics
that are relevant for the acquisition decision, the acquired plants (treated plants)
and domestic plants (non-treated plants) would have similar employment under
13To make a clear distinction between correlation and causality, our analysis focuses on the
plants that change from domestic to foreign ownership.
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the same conditions:
E(Emp1   Emp0 j FDI=1) = (3.25)
(E(Emp1 j FDI=1)  E(Emp0 jFDI=0))  (E(Emp0 jFDI=1)  E(Emp0 jFDI=0))
The second term in the equation is the selection bias which is assumed to be
zero conditional on a vector of observable plant characteristics. It is the di¤erence
between the outcome of plants that did receive treatment, under the hypotheti-
cal circumstances that they had not been acquired, and the plants remaining in
domestic hands. If the second term is zero, then the equation gives us the causal
e¤ect that we want to see. In other words, the employment di¤erence is a consis-
tent estimate of the causal e¤ect under the matching assumption. Therefore, if the
matching process is successful a causal interpretation to the average employment
di¤erence between treated and control plants is possible (Arnold and Javorcik,
2005).
3.3.2.1 Propensity Score Matching Propensity Score Matching is proposed
by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) in a seminal work as a method to eliminate the
bias in the estimation of treatment e¤ects with observational data sets. In the
assessment of the causal e¤ect it is impossible to observe individual treatment
e¤ects since the outcomes for untreated observations when it is under treatment
and for treated when it is not under treatment are not known.
The application of the propensity score matching involves estimating the propen-
sity scores as the rst step. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) dened the propensity
score as the conditional probability of receiving a treatment given pre-treatment
characteristics:
p(X)  Pr (D = 1 j X) = E (D j X) (3.24)
where D = (0; 1) is the indicator of exposure to treatment and X is the multi-
dimensional vector of pre-treatment characteristics.
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Given a population of units denoted by i, if one knows the propensity score
p(Xi) then one can estimate the Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated (ATT)
as follows:
 = EfY1i   Y0i j Di = 1g (3.25)
= EfE (Y1i   Y0i j Di = 1) ; p(Xi)gg
= EfEfY1i j Di = 1; p(Xi)g   EfY0i j Di = 0; p(Xi)g j Di = 1g
where the outer expectation is over distribution of (p(Xi) j Di = 1) and Y1i and
Y0i are the outcomes in the case of treatment and no treatment, respectively.
Given equation (3:24), the following two hypotheses should be satised to derive
(3:25).
Lemma 1 : Balancing of pre-treatment variables given in the propensity score.
If p(X) is the propensity score, then
D ? X j p(X)
Lemma 2: Unconfoundedness given the propensity score.
Suppose that assignment to treatment is unconfounded, i.e.,
Y1; Y0 ? D j X
Then assignment to treatment is uncounfounded given the propensity score,i.e,
Y1; Y0 ? D j p(X)
If the Balancing Hypotheses of Lemma 1 is satised, for a given propensity
score, receiving treatment is random and hence treated and control groups should
be statistically identical.
The estimation of the propensity score is implemented in Stata 10 using the
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program pscore.ado dened in the Becker and Ichino (2002). This program esti-
mates the propensity score and tests Balancing Hypothesis. The rst step is to
estimate a logit regression for rms, where the dependent variable FDI indicates if
a rms received any FDI inows (=1) or not (=0). For the di¤erent levels of FDI
the propensity scores estimations are repeated. Employment, employment square,
capital intensity (K/L), ratio of non-production workers, total factor productivity,
real investments are taken as the explanatory variables. These are the observable
characteristics of plants that will a¤ect receiving FDI. To avoid endogeneity, all
explanatory variables are lagged one year. A logit regression is conducted to iden-
tify whether these variables are statistically signicant or not. Note that, we nd
all explanatory variables to be statistically signicant implying that these are all
the signicant observable plant characteristics that a¤ect the probability of foreign
acquisition.
These logit estimates are used to generate a propensity score (pscore) for each
rm. All combinations of sectors and years where no foreign acquisition occurred
are dropped to increase the reliability of the model. Moreover, observations outside
the common support are excluded. This is done by adding a dummy variable named
comsup to the data set to identify the observations in the common support. The
balancing hypothesis test is performed by using the procedure suggested by Becker
and Ichino (2002). The balancing hypothesis is satised for each year and and each
sector implying that the approach is condentially able to group together relatively
identical plants.14
After estimating propensity scores rms that received FDI (treated group) and
those that did not (control group) are matched using the propensity score (pscore).
The variable pscore gives the probability that the rms will receive FDI given the
pre-characteristics included in logit regression.
In the application of propensity score matching, one-to-one nearest neighbor
14To make sure that we are matching identical plants, the balancing hypothesis test is con-
ducted for each sector and year. When the balancing hypothesis test is not satised then a
di¤erent matching procedure is used, such that for some years or sectors the real investment or
capital intensity are excluded from the estimation of propensity scores.
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matching is adopted with replacement. A caliper setting of 0.2 is also adopted
where the caliper ensures all the available treated rms are used. In addition, the
requirement that the matched plant observations come from the same sector and
year is imposed.15
3.3.2.2 Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences The last step16 involves comparing employ-
ment of the matched rms. This comparison is named as the Average Treatment
E¤ect on the Treated (ATT) and calculated as follows:
ATT =
1
n
nX
1
 
EmploymenttreatedyearA   EmploymentcontrolyearA
 
1
n
nX
1
 
EmploymenttreatedyearB   EmploymentcontrolyearB

where year A denotes either the acquisition year or the following years and year
B denotes the pre-acquisition year where yearA > yearB.
The advantage of combining propensity score matching approach with
di¤erence-in-di¤erences is to observe the divergence in the paths of performance
between the treated plants and the matched control plants that had similar char-
acteristics in the pre-acquisition year (Arnold and Javorcik, 2005). The benets of
combining these two approaches is also well accepted by recent studies which argue
that the standard matching estimators are unsatisfactory, but in combination with
di¤erence in di¤erences approach the matching analysis improves "...the quality of
non-experimental evaluation results signicantly" (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000,
pp. 438). Furthermore with the di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach we are able
to eliminate unobserved xed e¤ect di¤erences in employment between acquired
plants and non acquired plants, whereas the standard matching estimators fail to
eliminate (Smith and Todd, 2005).
15The matching procedure is implemented in Stata 10 using a modied version of the procedure
described in psmatch2.ado suggested by Leuven and Sianesi (2001).
16Carried out using the Stata implementation matchcat by Arnold and Javorcik (2009).
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CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section the e¤ects of FDI inows on plant employment are examined
for di¤erent levels of FDI inows. The results are reported from Table-8 through
Table-25.
4.1 Main Results
The primary results give the average di¤erence in employment in the matched
pairs, net of the average initial di¤erence before the acquisition. We look at the
employment e¤ects of foreign ownerships at di¤erent levels. The 10, 25, 50, 75,
100 percent foreign ownership e¤ects are examined, respectively. This captures the
possible di¤erence in results due to the extent of control by the foreign owners.
As can be seen in Table-8, between the year prior to the acquisition and the
acquisition year the divergence between the treatment and the control group is
signicant in terms of employment. As it can be seen in Table-8, between the
year prior to the acquisition and the acquisition year, a foreign acquisition leads
to an additional 13.5 percentage employment increase in the plants that have
foreign ownerships. Moreover, this e¤ect grows in the following year and reaches
22.9 percentage. By the end of the third year, foreign acquired rms enjoy an
employment advantage, which is equivalent to 21.2 percentage, over the control
group. In this and in all subsequent analyses, the rms that have never received
any FDI inows are taken as the control group.
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In our data the number of state-owned rms that have been a¢ liated by foreign
owners are relatively so small than the domestically owned rms and the number
of state-owned rms that have never received FDI inows have predominant share
among the state-owned rms. In order to make sure that the results are not driven
by any facts that are caused by the structure of the data, in the second analysis
state-owned rms are excluded and we focus on the e¤ects of foreign acquisitions
between the private establishments and foreign a¢ liated rms.
Although the results vary in number, the positive e¤ect is still observed. The
di¤erence-in-di¤erences results presented in Table-9 indicate that a foreign acqui-
sition leads to an additional 12.7 employment in the acquired plants compared to
statistically similar plants remaining in domestic hands. By the end of the second
year, the gap between the acquired and the private domestic rms widens to 21.6
percentage. The positive e¤ects also persist by the end of the third year by 19
percentage.
For both two cases, the divergence between the acquired plants and the control
plants is positive. The nal step in the analysis involves bootstrapping the ATT
results1 to check if the results are statistically di¤erent from zero. This gives an in-
dication of whether receiving FDI confers signicant increases in employment when
compared to rms that do not receive it. The condence intervals are reported
based on the bias-corrected condence intervals.
According to bias-corrected condence intervals, the results are statistically
signicant at the one percent level in the acquisition year and the following two
years.
As Table-10 presents, the positive e¤ects of FDI inows on plant employment is
still observed when plants with 25 percent or more foreign ownership are considered
as foreign a¢ liated. However, the e¤ects get smaller. As it can be seen in Table-10,
by the end of the acquisition year a foreign acquisition only leads to an additional
2.8 percentage employment increase in the plants that have foreign ownerships. By
1The ATT results are bootstrapped for 50 times for all of the analysis.
31
the end of the third year, foreign ownership leads to 7.9 percentage increase in the
treated plants. The analysis that excludes state-owned rms is also carried out for
the level of 25 percent foreign ownership. The results are almost the same as what
we have observed in the whole data set. Between the year prior to the acquisition
and the acquisition year, a foreign acquisition increases plant employment only
by 2.9 percentage and this e¤ect becomes 7.5 percentage by the end of the third
year. In this analysis there are 128 matched plants. The observed e¤ects are all
statistically signicant at the one percent level according to the bias- corrected
condence intervals.
When we only consider the plants that have 50 percent or more foreign owner-
ship as foreign a¢ liated, as evident in Table-11, employment e¤ects of FDI inows
into manufacturing sector is still positive, however the observed e¤ects are smaller
than the e¤ects obtained in the case of rms with 10 percent or more are consid-
ered as foreign a¢ liated. For both including state-owned enterprises and excluding
those from the sample, the same qualitative results are observed. In the case when
state-owned rms are included, foreign acquired rms lead to 5.6 percentage in-
crease in employment in the acquisition year and gets to 12.6 percentage by the
end of the third year and in the case when state-owned rms are excluded, FDI
inows have a slightly greater positive impact on plant employment. By the end of
the acquisition year, a foreign acquisition increases plant employment only by 6.9
percentage and this e¤ect becomes 15.6 percentage by the end of the third year.
All the results are statistically signicant at the one percent level but note that
this analysis restricts the number of matches to 98 plants.
The analysis that considers only the plants that receive 75 percent or more
foreign ownership as foreign a¢ liated reduces the number of matched plants to 63
plants. The analysis suggests that between the year prior to the acquisition and
the acquisition year the divergence between the treatment and the control group is
positive but smaller than obtained earlier. As it can be seen in Table-12, between
the year prior to the acquisition and the acquisition year, a foreign acquisition
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leads to an additional 6.9 percentage employment increase in the plants that have
foreign ownerships. However, this e¤ect does not grow in the following years and
stands at 5 percentage. As Table-12 presents, for 75 percent acquisition level the
results do not di¤er much between the whole data set and when state-owned rms
are excluded from the data set. All results are statistically signicant at the one
percent signicance level.
Finally, the analysis is conducted for the plants with 100 percent foreign own-
ership at the acquisition year. Although the positive e¤ects are not observed until
the end of the second year, by the end of the third year, foreign acquired rms
enjoy an employment advantage, which is equivalent to 15.1 percentage (see Table-
13), over the control group. The observed negative e¤ects for the acquisition year
and following year are very small. However, unlike other cases, in this case the
e¤ects di¤er when state-owned rms are excluded in the data set. While foreign
rms only lead to a 2.6 percentage decrease at the acquisition year for the whole
data set, the negative e¤ect increases to 11 percentage when state-owned rms are
dropped from the data. The e¤ects are almost the same by the end of the second
year for both cases, but by the end of the third year foreign ownership leads to an
9.4 percentage, which is less than 15.1 percentage when we only focus on private
establishments.
In the literature Arnold and Javorcik (2005) studied the plant performance of
Indonesian manufacturing rms by employing the method of di¤erence-in-di¤erences
combined with propensity score matching. For the employment analysis they also
observe the positive e¤ects of FDI inows when 10 percent is chosen as a threshold
level to become foreign acquired. However, this thesis shows that the employment
e¤ects can di¤er due to di¤erent levels of FDI inows. Hence, in this thesis not
only do we replicate the study of Arnold and Javorcik (2005), but we also provide
evidence that the employment e¤ects di¤er for di¤erent levels of FDI inows.
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4.2 Robustness Checks
4.2.1 Extending the Time Horizon
In this section the time horizon is extended by two more years to ensure that
the employment increase due to FDI is not a temporary phenomenon. For the
rst case the di¤erence-in-di¤erences results presented in Table-14 indicate that
the employment increase experienced by the foreign a¢ liated rms continue in
the third and fourth year. By the end of the fourth year the employment gap
between foreign a¢ liated rms and local rms increases to 24.1 percentage and
this di¤erence gets larger at the end of the fth year being 27 percentage. These
results are signicant at the one percent level considering the 99% bias corrected
condence intervals. Note that, as the time horizon is extended the number of
observations from matching decreases.
In the analysis which state-owned rms are excluded from the sample the re-
sults indicate that the additional employment experienced by the foreign acquired
rms also continue in the following two years. By the end of the fourth year the
employment gap between the foreign acquired rms and local rms widens to 20.5
and the di¤erence is 22.3 percentage at the end of the fth year. These results are
also signicant at the one percent level considering the 99 percent bias corrected
condence intervals. Note that, as the time horizon is extended the size of the
sample is limited (see Table-14).
As Table-15 presents, the positive e¤ects of FDI inows on plant employment
persists when plants with 25 percent or more foreign ownership are considered
as foreign a¢ liated. As can be seen in Table-15, by the end of the fourth year
a foreign acquisition leads to an additional 10.7 percentage employment increase
in the plants that have foreign ownerships. By the end of the fth year, foreign
ownership leads to 16.3 percentage increase in the treated plants. The analysis that
excludes state-owned rms is also carried out for the level of 25 percent foreign
ownership and the results do not di¤er in magnitude. By the end of the fourth
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year and fth year foreign acquired rms enjoy an employment advantage by 10.2
and 14.6 percentage over the control group, respectively.
The analysis that considers only the plants that receive 50 percent or more
foreign ownership as foreign a¢ liated shows that when the time horizon is extended
to four years the results that is obtained by the end of the third year do not change
qualitatively. By the end of the fourth year, foreign ownership leads to a 11.2
percentage employment increase in the domestic rms. However, when the time
horizon is extended to ve years the employment e¤ects are almost insignicant by
the end of the fth year (see Table-16). As Table-16 presents when we only focus on
the private establishments, by the end of the fourth year foreign acquisition leads
to a 9 percentage employment increase in the domestic rms where this e¤ect again
gets insignicant (1 percentage point) by the end of the fth year as observed in the
preceding analysis. Although the observed e¤ects are all statistically signicant
at the one percent level according to the bias-corrected condence intervals, the
e¤ects are not economically signicant by the end of the fth year.
In the case of the plants that have 75 percent or more foreign ownership, as
evident in Table-17, the causal e¤ect of foreign ownership on domestic rms is
negative by the end of the fourth and the fth years. For the case where we include
all the rms, these negative e¤ects are -4.8 and -8.2 percentage, respectively. For
the case where we only focus on private establishments by the end of the fourth
and fth years the negative e¤ects are -3.5 and -4.3 percentage. However, one
should consider that this analysis restricts the number of matched plants to 51
and 34 where these numbers are relatively small when compared to the other.
Furthermore, it should also be noted that in our data there are not many rms
that are acquired by 75 percent or more there are not many rms that are acquired
by 75 percent and survive up to ve years.
For the plants with 100 percent foreign ownership at the acquisition year, by
the end of the fourth year the employment increase experienced by the foreign
a¢ liated rms is 17.7 percentage and this increase is 11.2 percentage when only
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private establishments are considered in the matching process. However, by the
end of the fth year the positive employment e¤ects are replaced by negative
e¤ects, by -1 and -8 percentage; respectively. Again, the results should be read
carefully, since the number of matched plants decreases to 17 and 10 plants (see
Table-18). This small number of matches gives a signal that in the data we do not
have enough number of rms that are acquired by 100 percent.
4.2.2 Removing the restriction on matching within sectors
In order to make sure that restricting the control observations to come from the
same sector and year does not distort the results, the results are also obtained
without imposing this constraint and are presented in Table-19. As evident from
Table-19, for both including state-owned enterprises and excluding those from the
sample, the same qualitative results are obtained with this modication. In the
case when state-owned rms are included, foreign acquired rms lead to a 12.6
percentage increase in employment in the acquisition year and this increase also
persists by the end of the third year. Besides, when state-owned rms are excluded
foreign acquired rms also enjoy an employment advantage over the control group
equivalent to 8 percentage by the end of the third year. Although the same qual-
itative results are observed, allowing out-of-sector matching produces somewhat
smaller e¤ects for the acquisition year and the following year when compared to
the restriction imposed case.
As Table-20 presents, the positive e¤ects of FDI inows on plant employment is
still observed when plants with 25 percent or more foreign ownership are considered
as foreign a¢ liated in the non-restriction case. By the end of the third year, foreign
ownership leads to 10.8 percentage increase in the treated plants. The analysis that
excludes state-owned rms is also carried out for the level of 25 percent foreign
ownership and it is observed that foreign acquisition leads to a 11.6 percentage
employment increase in the domestic rms. Although we observe insignicant
but negative e¤ects in two years, as Table-21 presents, by the end of the third
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year the employment gap between foreign acquired and domestic rms is almost
7 percentage for both cases when state-owned rms are included and excluded
when the 50 percent level of FDI inows are taken as a threshold level to become
acquired. For 75 percent level of FDI inows, by the end of the third year foreign
acquired rms lead to 6.4 percentage increase for both cases where this e¤ect is
slightly larger than the e¤ect that we have observed in the restriction imposed case
(see Table-22). For the plants with 100 percent foreign ownership at the acquisition
year, although the observed e¤ects are negative around three percentage for two
years time period, by the end of the third year employment increase experienced by
the foreign a¢ liated rms is 14.9 percentage and this increase is 16 percentage when
only private establishments are considered in the matching process (see Table-23).
4.2.3 Evidence on Output and Total Factor Productivity
If our ndings of increased employment are due to FDI, we would also expect to see
the positive e¤ects of FDI inows on output and total factor productivity. In the
analysis, the real output in the logarithmic form is used. Total factor productivity
is calculated based on the methodology described in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
As illustrated in Table-24 and Table-25, foreign ownership leads to an increase in
output and production in the manufacturing industry. Although the e¤ects are
small in the acquisition year, foreign acquired rms have higher production by
the end of the third year by 21 percentage when both state-owned rms included
and excluded cases. In addition, foreign acquisition also leads to approximately
10 percentage increase in the productivity by the end of the second year for both
state-owned rms included and excluded cases. All of the observed e¤ects are
statistically signicant at the one percent signicance level throughout the period
considered.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
This study investigates the relationship between FDI inows and employment
at the plant level in Turkey. The literature on the employment e¤ects shows that
identifying the correlation and the causal relationship between foreign ownership
and plantsemployment is not straightforward and the results are prone to change
by di¤erent methodologies. The aim of this study is to search for the employment
e¤ects of FDI inows by using the strategy of di¤erence-in-di¤erences combined
with propensity score matching.
To identify the correlation and the causality, a rm-level unbalanced panel
data from the Turkish manufacturing industry covering the period of 1990-2001
is used. First, one of the explanatory variables that would a¤ect the probability
of receiving FDI, the rm-level TFP, is estimated at the level of 3-digit sectors
by using Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) methodology. Then the propensity score of each
rm is calculated for each sector and year, followed by imposing the within year and
sector restriction di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach combined with propensity score
matching. At rst, the analysis includes the acquisition year and the following two
years. Then I extend the time period to ve years to make sure that the e¤ects of
FDI inows are not temporary. Moreover, to ensure that the results are not driven
by the restriction imposed, the analysis is also conducted without matching within
sector/year restriction. Finally the productivity and output e¤ects of FDI inows
are also examined. All of these estimation procedures are conducted for both the
whole data and for a data set where the state-owned rms excluded.
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The baseline results suggest that between the year prior to the acquisition and
the acquisition year, a foreign acquisition leads to an additional 13.5 percentage
points employment increase in the plants that have foreign ownerships and by
the end of the third year, foreign acquired rms enjoy an employment advantage,
which is equivalent to 21.2 percentage points, over the control group. For the
state-owned rms excluded case, although the results vary in number, the positive
e¤ects is still observed. The di¤erence-in-di¤erences results show that a foreign
acquisition leads to an additional 12.7 employment in the acquired plants where
this additional employment e¤ects can not be shared by statistically similar plants
remaining in domestic hands. The positive e¤ects also persist by the end of the
third year by 19 percentage points.
As mentioned above, the results are robust when we extend the time horizon.
The results for the whole data suggest that by the end of the fourth year the
employment gap between foreign a¢ liated rms and local rms increases to 24.1
percentage points and this di¤erence gets larger at the end of the fth year being
27 percentage points. Also, the results are robust to the case where we only
focus on private establishments, where we nd by the end of the fourth year the
employment gap between the foreign acquired rms and local rms widens to 20.5
and the di¤erence is 22.3 percentage points at the end of the fth year.
Although the numbers are smaller than what we have observed with the re-
striction imposed case, the results for without restriction also suggest signicant
and positive employment e¤ects of FDI. For the whole data, foreign acquired rms
lead to 12.6 percentage points increase in the acquisition year and this increase also
persists by the end of the third year. Besides, foreign acquired rms also enjoy an
employment advantage over the control group equivalent to 8 percentage points by
the end of the third year. And the positive e¤ects of FDI inows for both output
and productivity are observed.
Unlike the other studies that have been issued for the employment e¤ects of FDI
for Turkey, this study nds signicant and positive e¤ects of foreign acquisitions
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on plant employment by using the standard denition of FDI. Furthermore, not
only do I examine the employment e¤ects of FDI inows by using the standard
denition of FDI as is done in the literature, but I also look into the possible
di¤erentiale e¤ects of di¤erent levels of FDI and identify these e¤ects at the 10,
25, 50, 75 and 100 percent levels of foreign ownership, respectively. I nd that
as the dominance of foreign rms in the acquired rm increases the employment
e¤ects of FDI inows begins to decrease, explain this result by the fact that the
increase in FDI managerial control makes the restructuring process more active
and this limits the employment improvement in the acquired rms, as expected.
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APPENDIX
FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1: World FDI Inows
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
World Investment Report
Figure 2: FDI Inows to Turkey, 1990-2007
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
World Investment Report
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Figure 3: FDI Inows to Turkey, 1990-2001
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
World Investment Report
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Figure 4: Comparison of FDI inows
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
World Investment Report
Figure 5: Shares of Industries, 1990-2001
Source: OECD
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Figure 6: Shares of Industries, 2001-2007
Source : OECD
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Year
Years 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Number of plants 5201 5073 5665 6653 6606 6889 7089 7506 8076 7690 7669 7756
Number of FA plants 206 205 220 259 268 280 279 305 340 356 356 379
Percent of FA plants 3.9 4.0 3.9 3.9 4.0 4.0 3.9 4.0 4.2 4.6 4.6 4.9
Source : TurkStat.
Notes : Plants with 10 percent or more foreign ownership are considered as foreign a¢ liated (FA) plants.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Sector
Sector All Plants-Years FA Plants-Years % of FA Plants
311 8313 328 4
312 3189 150 4.7
313 973 47 4.8
321 14723 240 1.6
322 11344 268 2.4
323 1026 2 0.19
324 929 6 0.7
331 1660 16 0.96
332 1174 11 0.93
341 1501 81 5.4
351 877 105 12
352 2476 369 14.9
355 1254 64 5.1
356 3040 144 4.7
361 477 9 1.9
362 655 24 3.7
369 6346 190 3
372 1073 32 2.9
381 6450 216 3.34
382 5214 230 4.4
383 3675 372 10.12
384 3771 374 9.9
390 983 43 4.3
Source: TurkStat.
Notes : Plants with 10 percent or more foreign ownership shares are dened as foreign a¢ liated (FA) plants.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics-Number of Firms with Di¤erent Levels of FDI
Year 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
1990 206 186 171 151 107 86 80 70 60 35
1991 205 186 174 156 112 88 78 66 56 32
1992 220 196 285 169 119 90 82 76 64 41
1993 259 234 219 196 144 116 107 94 80 52
1994 268 244 226 203 151 125 117 102 91 57
1995 280 261 240 216 162 136 122 105 95 63
1996 279 258 240 223 166 134 118 102 91 61
1997 305 282 256 235 162 132 119 98 91 51
1998 340 313 283 264 179 150 134 116 105 60
1999 356 330 302 277 196 161 147 127 116 82
2000 356 335 306 281 209 183 169 149 135 94
2001 379 358 332 301 230 203 190 168 149 114
Source : TurkStat.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics by Year
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
All Plants
Avg. Emp. 186 176 158 138 134 133 139 143 140 137 140 133
Avg. Output 32.4 35.2 36.3 36.1 33.4 36.5 36.0 40.1 38.2 38.8 41.9 40.2
Avg. K/L 195.7 149.0 160.7 193.1 173.9 177.4 175.8 151.6 149.1 161.4 150.1 159.2
Avg. TFP 6.2 6.2 6.4 6.4 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
FA Plants
Avg. Emp. 430 436 425 383 352 341 340 343 347 330 346 333
Avg. Output 133.7 153.9 178.1 201.8 160.8 188.5 182.2 195.0 188.2 186.3 217.1 203.1
Avg. K/L 201.7 184.1 170.9 175.8 202.7 199.0 218.3 221.5 213.5 237.6 244.6 268.8
Avg. TFP 6.6 6.7 6.9 7.03 6.9 7.05 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.8 6.9 6.9
Local Plants
Avg. Emp. 172 162 146 130 123 124 128 133 130 127 128 122
Avg. Output 27.3 29.2 30.0 28.8 27.4 29.3 29.0 32.3 31.1 31.3 32.7 31.2
Avg. K/L 194.2 147.1 160.1 193.9 172.2 176.1 173.4 147.6 145.3 156.1 143.8 152.3
Avg. TFP 6.2 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
Source : TURKSTAT
Notes : Plants with 10 percent or more foreign ownership are considered as foreign a¢ liated (FA) plants. Output
and capital/labor is in billion 1990 TL. TFP is calculated by Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) procedure.
Table 5: Summary Statistics by Sector
Sector Avg. Emp Avg. K/L Avg. Output Avg. TFP
311 176 169.1 32.0 4.8
312 86 126.6 23.7 5.0
313 156 196.0 58.0 4.5
321 192 178.9 28.7 5.0
322 105 78.9 13.2 8.5
323 69 76.9 17.0 7.9
324 102 47.7 9.5 3.8
331 88 82.2 16.7 6.6
332 101 67.4 11.8 5.6
341 172 139.5 36.5 5.1
351 353 267.7 132.2 6.8
352 154 225.4 54.3 6.5
355 128 83.8 27.1 3.3
356 83 178.6 24.4 5.9
361 318 215.7 67.7 4.6
362 241 189.9 66.8 5.2
369 87 171.2 17.2 3.5
372 164 145.9 49.7 6.2
381 90 214.9 21.3 6.9
382 118 116.5 26.2 5.0
383 165 158.7 79.0 6.9
384 243 108.2 67.7 5.3
390 83 179.9 96.5 4.7
Source: TurkStat.
Notes : Plants with 10 percent or more foreign ownership are considered as foreign a¢ liated (FA) plants.
Output and capital/labor is in billion 1990 TL. TFP is calculated by Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) procedure.
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Table 6: OLS Estimates of Production Function (1990-2001), Dependent Variable:
Value Added
Sector Labor*** S.E. Capital S.E No of Obs.
311 Food 1.06 0.03 0.18*** 0.01 4650
312 Food Miscellaneous 0.99 0.05 0.12*** 0.03 1379
313 Beverages 1.51 0.13 0.13*** 0.06 639
321 Textiles 1.01 0.02 0.16*** 0.01 9329
322 Wearing Appeal 0.94 0.04 0.09*** 0.02 5161
323 Leather Products 1.01 0.09 0.13*** 0.04 637
324 Footwear 1.17 0.11 0.06 0.05 359
331 Wood Products 1.17 0.79 0.15*** 0.03 1022
332 Furniture 1.34 0.09 0.08*** 0.04 563
341 Paper 0.82 0.12 0.26*** 0.06 835
351 Industrial Chemicals 0.71 0.12 0.26*** 0.07 554
352 Other Chemicals 1.00 0.07 0.27*** 0.04 1552
355 Rubber Products 1.05 0.09 0.28*** 0.03 877
356 Plastics 1.10 0.05 0.19*** 0.02 2410
361 Seramics 1.17 0.14 0.23*** 0.06 337
362 Glass 1.07 0.09 0.24*** 0.04 470
369 Non-metal Minerals 1.29 0.05 0.27*** 0.02 4212
372 Non-ferrous Metals 1.11 0.07 0.14*** 0.03 853
381 Fabricated Metals 1.02 0.03 0.20*** 0.02 4625
382 Non-electrical Mach. 1.12 0.04 0.12*** 0.01 3622
383 Electrical Machinery 1.10 0.04 0.20*** 0.02 2768
384 Transport Equipment 1.08 0.04 0.17*** 0.02 2787
390 Other Manufacturing Prod. 1.23 0.13 0.17*** 0.04 569
Notes : S.E. denotes standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate the statistical signicance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels,
respectively. Statistical signicance indicators apply to all sectors if it is next to the variable name.
Table 7: Levinsohn-Petrin Estimates of Production Function (1990-2001), Depen-
dent Variable: Value Added
Sector Labor*** S.E. Capital S.E No of Obs.
311 Food 0.78 0.03 0.27*** 0.06 4649
312 Food Miscellaneous 0.74 0.05 0.15 0.11 1379
313 Beverages 0.89 0.15 0.28*** 0.13 639
321 Textiles 0.62 0.02 0.26*** 0.04 9325
322 Wearing Appeal 0.49 0.05 0.03 0.07 5158
323 Leather Products 0.39 0.05 0.20 0.10 637
324 Footwear 0.65 0.12 -0.06 0.24 359
331 Wood Products 0.47 0.06 0.26** 0.11 1022
332 Furniture 0.99 0.15 -0.10 0.20 563
341 Paper 0.45 0.15 0.16 0.14 835
351 Industrial Chemicals 0.46 0.18 0.31 0.30 553
352 Other Chemicals 0.60 0.07 0.25*** 0.11 1551
355 Rubber Products 0.58 0.08 0.48*** 0.14 877
356 Plastics 0.62 0.05 0.30*** 0.07 2410
361 Seramics 0.59 0.13 0.20 0.15 336
362 Glass 0.81 0.05 0.26** 0.10 470
369 Non-metal Minerals 0.84 0.03 0.34*** 0.07 4123
372 Non-ferrous Metals 0.81 0.07 0.11 0.11 853
381 Fabricated Metals 0.46 0.06 0.17*** 0.05 4623
382 Non-electrical Mach. 0.73 0.02 0.30*** 0.06 3622
383 Electrical Machinery 0.56 0.05 0.27*** 0.07 2768
384 Transport Equipment 0.72 0.05 0.11*** 0.07 2787
390 Other Manufacturing Prod. 0.90 0.13 0.25*** 0.24 569
Notes : S.E. denotes standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate the statistical signicance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels,
respectively. Statistical signicance indicators apply to all sectors if it is next to the variable name.
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Table 8: Matching Results for Employment-10 percent
E¤ect of Foreign Acquisition Log Employment
Acquisition year 0.135***
(0.068)
Following year 0.229***
(0.078)
Two years later 0.212***
(0.083)
n 118
Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated (ATT), bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
n= number of matched acquisitions
***,**,* indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
Table 9: Matching Results-Stateowned Firms are excluded-10 percent
E¤ect of Foreign Acquisition Log Employment
Acquisition year 0.127***
(0.069)
Following year 0.216***
(0.078)
Two years later 0.190***
(0.084)
n 118
Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated (ATT), bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
***,**,* indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
n= number of matched acquisitions
Table 10: Matching Results for Employment-FDI level 25 percent
Whole data Stateowned rms are excluded
E¤ect of Foreign Acquisition Log Employment Log Employment
Acquisition year 0.028*** 0.029***
(0.059) (0.046)
One year later 0.07*** 0.072***
(0.087) (0.073)
Two years later 0.079*** 0.075***
(0.086) (0.062)
n 128 128
n=number of matched acquisitions
Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated (ATT), bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
***,**,* indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
51
Table 11: Matching Results for Employment-FDI level 50 percent
Whole data Stateowned rms are excluded
E¤ect of Foreign Acquisition Log Employment Log Employment
Acquisition year 0.056*** 0.069***
(0.056) (0.055)
One year later 0.118*** 0.152***
(0.061) (0.075)
Two years later 0.126*** 0.156***
(0.093) (0.101)
n 98 98
n=number of matched acquisitions
Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated (ATT), bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
***,**,* indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
Table 12: Matching Results for Employment-FDI level 75 percent
Whole data Stateowned rms are excluded
E¤ect of Foreign Acquisition Log Employment Log Employment
Acquisition year 0.069*** 0.073***
(0.067) (0.054)
One year later -0.001*** 0.009***
(0.073) (0.084)
Two years later 0.051*** 0.056***
(0.104) (0.07)
n 63 63
n=number of matched acquisitions
Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated (ATT), bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
***,**,* indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 13: Matching Results for Employment-FDI level 100 percent
Whole data Stateowned rms are excluded
E¤ect of Foreign Acquisition Log Employment Log Employment
Acquisition year -0.026*** -0.11***
(0.079) (0.101)
One year later -0.032*** -0.039***
(0.118) (0.107)
Two years later 0.151*** 0.094***
(0.187) (0.163)
n 22 22
n=number of matched acquisitions
Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated (ATT), bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
***,**,* indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 14: Matching Results-Longer Horizon-10 percent
Whole data Stateowned rms are excluded
E¤ect of Foreign Acquisition Log Employment Log Employment Log Employment Log Employment
Acquisition year 0.180*** 0.187*** 0.176*** 0.184***
(0.068) (0.115) (0.109) (0.116)
One year later 0.266*** 0.310*** 0.254*** 0.304***
(0.077) (0.090) (0.071) (0.125)
Two years later 0.264*** 0.329*** 0.236*** 0.311***
(0.118) (0.104) (0.11) (0.108)
Three years later 0.241*** 0.270*** 0.205*** 0.231***
(0.107) (0.121) (0.101) (0.097)
Four years later 0.270*** 0.223***
(0.136) (0.133)
n 96 70 96 70
n= number of matched acquisitions
Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated (ATT), bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
***,**,* indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
Table 15: Matching Results for Employment-Time Horizon Extended-FDI level 25
percent
Whole data Stateowned rms are excluded
E¤ect of Foreign Acquisition Log Employment Log Employment Log Employment Log Employment
Acquisition year 0.047*** 0.0892*** 0.05*** 0.09***
(0.069) (0.071) (0.058) (0.104)
One year later 0.104*** 0.159*** 0.111*** 0.163***
(0.076) (0.104) (0.077) (0.098)
Two years later 0.110*** 0.18*** 0.106*** 0.176***
(0.093) (0.131) (0.065) (0.143)
Three years later 0.107*** 0.193*** 0.102*** 0.179***
(0.11) (0.114) (0.08) (0.125)
Four years later 0.163*** 0.146***
(0.161) (0.132)
n 105 71 105 71
n=number of matched acquisitions
Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated (ATT), bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
***,**,* indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 16: Matching Results for Employment-Time Horizon Extended-FDI level 50
percent
Whole data Stateowned rms are excluded
E¤ect of Foreign Acquisition Log Employment Log Employment Log Employment Log Employment
Acquisition year 0.075*** 0.0005*** 0.053*** 0.013***
(0.081) (0.121) (0.083) (0.105)
One year later 0.132*** 0.046*** 0.121*** 0.079***
(0.087) (0.109) (0.105) (0.101)
Two years later 0.07*** 0.057*** 0.051*** 0.079***
(0.093) (0.120) (0.149) (0.162)
Three years later 0.112*** 0.075*** 0.09*** 0.088***
(0.098) (0.123) (0.096) (0.162)
Four years later -0.011*** 0.01***
(0.133) (0.082)
n 80 55 80 55
n=number of matched acquisitions
Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated (ATT), bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
***,**,* indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
Table 17: Matching Results for Employment-Time Horizon Extended-FDI level 75
percent
Whole data Stateowned rms are excluded
E¤ect of Foreign Acquisition Log Employment Log Employment Log Employment Log Employment
Acquisition year 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.047*** 0.049***
(0.075) (0.093) (0.05) (0.076)
One year later -0.011*** 0.046*** 0.002*** 0.073***
(0.077) (0.088) (0.091) (0.101)
Two years later 0.005*** 0.01*** 0.016*** 0.037***
(0.103) (0.104) (0.118) (0.112)
Three years later -0.048*** -0.161*** -0.035*** -0.125***
(0.119) (0.128) (0.088) (0.14)
Four years later -0.082*** -0.043***
(0.165) (0.129)
n 51 34 51 34
n=number of matched acquisitions
Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated (ATT), bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
***,**,* indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 18: Matching Results for Employment-Time Horizon Extended-FDI level 100
percent
Whole data Stateowned rms are excluded
E¤ect of Foreign Acquisition Log Employment Log Employment Log Employment Log Employment
Acquisition year -0.001*** 0.011*** -0.1*** -0.15***
(0.108) (0.147) (0.135) (0.17)
One year later 0.028*** -0.032*** -0.004*** -0.053***
(0.16) (0.117) (0.129) (0.103)
Two years later 0.246*** 0.127*** 0.175*** 0.09***
(0.205) (0.257) (0.244) (0.327)
Three years later 0.177*** 0.058*** 0.112*** -0.014***
(0.213) (0.319) (0.243) (0.269)
Four years later -0.016*** -0.08***
(0.191) (0.179)
n 17 10 17 10
n=number of matched acquisitions
Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated (ATT), bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
***,**,* indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 19: Matching Results for Employment, not restricted within sector/year-10
percent
Whole data Stateowned rms are excluded
E¤ect of Foreign Acquisition Log Employment Log Employment
Acquisition year 0.126*** 0.093***
(0.063) (0.079)
Following year 0.152*** 0.111***
(0.072) (0.065)
Two years later 0.125*** 0.08***
(0.084) (0.074)
n 124 124
n= number of matched acquisitions
Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated (ATT), bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
***,**,* indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
Table 20: Matching Results for Employment-Without Restriction-FDI level 25 per-
cent
Whole data Stateowned rms are excluded
E¤ect of Foreign Acquisition Log Employment Log Employment
Acquisition year 0.064*** 0.063***
(0.062) (0.058)
One year later 0.073*** 0.077***
(0.072) (0.085)
Two years later 0.108*** 0.116***
(0.079) (0.066)
n 137 137
n=number of matched acquisitions
Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated (ATT), bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
***,**,* indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 21: Matching Results for Employment-Without Restriction-FDI level 50 per-
cent
Whole data Stateowned rms are excluded
E¤ect of Foreign Acquisition Log Employment Log Employment
Acquisition year -0.037*** -0.031***
(0.045) (0.049)
One year later -0.025*** -0.022***
(0.053) (0.053)
Two years later 0.072*** 0.076***
(0.103) (0.076)
n 103 103
n=number of matched acquisitions
Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated (ATT), bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
***,**,* indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
Table 22: Matching Results for Employment-Without Restriction-FDI level 75 per-
cent
Whole data Stateowned rms are excluded
E¤ect of Foreign Acquisition Log Employment Log Employment
Acquisition year 0.046*** 0.05***
(0.048) (0.051)
One year later 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.08) (0.077)
Two years later 0.064*** 0.064***
(0.074) (0.097)
n 69 69
n=number of matched acquisitions
Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated (ATT), bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
***,**,* indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 23: Matching Results for Employment-Without Restriction-FDI level 100
percent
Whole data Stateowned rms are excluded
E¤ect of Foreign Acquisition Log Employment Log Employment
Acquisition year 0.069*** 0.074***
(0.09) (0.093)
One year later -0.03*** -0.002***
(0.188) (0.153)
Two years later 0.149*** 0.16***
(0.201) (0.22)
n 22 22
n=number of matched acquisitions
Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated (ATT), bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
***,**,* indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 24: Matching Results for Output
Whole data Stateowned rms are excluded
E¤ect of Foreign Acquisition Log Output Log Output
Acquisition year 0.04*** 0.033***
(0.063) (0.061)
One year later 0.174*** 0.162***
(0.09) (0.107)
Two years later 0.21*** 0.211***
(0.107) (0.075)
n 118 118
n= number of matched acquisitions
Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated (ATT), bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
***,**,* indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
Table 25: Matching Results for TFP
Whole data Stateowned rms are excluded
E¤ect of Foreign Acquisition Log TFP Log TFP
Acquisition year 0.029*** 0.016***
(0.061) (0.053)
One year later 0.116*** 0.105***
(0.074) (0.064)
Two years later 0.089*** 0.095***
(0.065) (0.064)
n 142 142
n= number of matched acquisitions
Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated (ATT), bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
***,**,* indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
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